Manuscripts available on request.


Belief Revision

Consensus Does Not Justify Contraction (with Isaac Levi)

Unanimous Consensus against AGM?
[Preprint]{Journal}

Decision Theory

Conditional Choice with a Vacuous Second Tier
[Preprint] [Journal]

Social Choice Theory for Deliberative Democrats


Probability

A Modest Orgulity Argument (with Michael Nielsen)

Another Approach to Consensus and Maximally Informed Opinions with Increasing Evidence (with Michael Nielsen)

Distention for Sets of Probabilities (with Michael Nielsen)

Generalized Superconditioning (with Michael Nielsen)

Learning and Pooling, Pooling and Learning (with Ignacio Ojea Quintana)
[Preprint] [Journal]

Modesty: Opinionation or Regularity? (with Michael Nielsen)

On a Disanalogy between Measure and Algebra (with Michael Nielsen)

Persistent Disagreement and Polarization in a Bayesian Setting (with Michael Nielsen)

Probabilistic Opinion Pooling with Imprecise Probabilities (with Ignacio Ojea Quintana) 
[Preprint] [Journal]

Dissertation

Mathematical aggregation frameworks are general and precise settings in which to study ways of forming a consensus or group point of view from a set of potentially diverse points of view. Yet the standard frameworks have significant limitations. A number of results show that certain sets of desirable aggregation properties cannot be simultaneously satisfied. Drawing on work in the theory of imprecise probabilities, I propose philosophically-motivated generalizations of the standard aggregation frameworks (for probability, preference, full belief) that I prove can satisfy the desired properties. I then look at some applications and consequences of these proposals in decision theory, epistemology, and the social sciences. 
[Short Abstract] [Extended Abstract]